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Profit Sharing-NEw DEFINITION OF A PARTNERSHIP "PROFITS
INTEREST" DISQUALIFIES AN OTHERWISE QUALIFIED PROFIT SHARING
PLAN-Hill Farrer & Burrill, 67 T.C. 411 (1976).
Hill Farrer & Burrill' involved a general partnership of nineteen
members engaged in the practice of law. All partners contributed
substantially equal amounts to the capital of the partnership and
shared in partnership assets in proportion to their respective contri-
butions. Profits from legal services were divided among the partners
in three stages. First, twenty percent of a client's fees for services
(less proportional overhead) was allocated to the partner or asso-
ciate responsible for producing the client, or to the partner or asso-
ciate whose original client in turn referred a new client to the part-
nership. The partnership agreement specified that these twenty per-
cent interests-which would be paid to the partner or his successors
in interest for five years following the partner's permanent retire-
ment from the practice of law, total disability, or death-were as-
signable. Second, two-thirds of the remaining profits were allocated
among the partners in accordance with the ratio by which their legal
services contributed to the total partnership profit during the year.
Third, the final one-third of profits was allocated among the nine-
teen partners according to the ratio of their capital contributions.2
The partnership maintained separate drawing accounts to which
each partner's share of profits was credited and all drawings were
charged.3
The partnership sought to qualify its profit sharing plan under
section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 4 Qualified plans
have several tax advantages: employer's contributions are currently
deductible, the fund's income is exempt from federal income taxa-
tion, and distributions to a beneficiary are not taxed until received
or available.' Under certain circumstances these distributions may
1. 67 T.C. 411 (1976), appeal by the partnership pending (9th Cir.), [19781 4 FED. TAXES
(P-H) 19,266(7). Judge Featherstone's opinion was reviewed by the court. Judge Tannen-
wald concurred in a separate opinion in which Judges Irwin and Wilbur agreed. Judge Goffe
wrote a dissenting opinion in which Judges Drennan, Sterrett, and Wiles agreed.
The petitioner will hereinafter be referred to as "the partnership."
2. Id. at 413-14. Partnership profits from sources other than fees for legal services ren-
dered, including gains or losses on the sale of capital assets, or other losses, were allocated
among the 19 partners in proportibn to their cash capital contribution, except that losses from
maintaining branch offices were deducted from total firm profits rather than directly allo-
cated among the partners. Id. at 413.
3. Id. at 413.
4. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, as amended [hereinafter I.R.C.].
5. Id. §§ 402(a)(1), 403(a)(1).
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be treated as capital gain.' Also, to the extent attributable to em-
ployer contributions, death benefits payable to a deceased em-
ployee's successors in interest, other than the decedent's estate, are
excluded from estate taxation.7
Tighter rules govern the qualification of plans benefiting "owner-
employees," persons who own more than ten percent of a business.
Congress enacted these "tighter rules . . . in order to prevent retire-
ment plans of owner-employees from becoming purely income-
averaging devices and to insure that contributions made for their
employees . . . [did] not inure to the benefit of owner-
employees." ' The Tax Court in Hill reviewed these additional re-
strictions:
[T]he trustee must be a bank or other approved person; coverage
must be extended to all full-time, nonseasonal employees with 3
or more years of services; such employees' rights are to be nonfor-
feitable upon contribution to the plan; a definite formula for deter-
mining employer contributions must be provided; and annual con-
tributions on behalf of an owner-employee are limited. Distribu-
tions are not to be made to an owner-employee before he reaches
the age of 59 1/2 years except in case of disability, and distributions
to an owner-employee are to be made no later than the taxable year
in which he reaches the age of 70 1/2.
In the case of a plan providing benefits for employees some or
all of whom are owner-employees who control the business, restric-
tions are placed upon transactions between the trust and such
owner-employees. These restrictions pertain to loans, compensa-
tion for personal services, preferential services, and property trans-
actions . .. .
The partnership conceded that if its plan failed to qualify under
the less stringent requirements of section 401(a), the plan would not
qualify under the foregoing additional requirements for plans cover-
ing owner-employees. 0 The Service ruled that the Hill partnership's
6. Id. §§ 402(a)(2), 403(a)(2).
7. Id. § 2039(c).
8. S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961), 1962-3 C.B. 303, 304.
9. 67 T.C. at 416 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the mechanics of qualifying a
plan, see Dahlgren, Dauenhauer, & Palmquist, Qualifying Retirement Plans Under ERISA,
11 GONZ. L. REV. 838 (1976); Tilton & McNabb, Complying With the IRS's New Guidelines
for Determinations of Qualified Plans, 44 J. TAX. 24 (1976).
10. 67 T.C. at 412. For an examination of the hazards of disqualification, see Moore,
Problems in Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, 25 TAx ExEc. 108 (1973); Simmons,
Dangers of Disqualification of Qualified Plans, 1975-1 N.Y.U. 33D INST. ON FED. TAX. 507. See
also Bachelder, Tax and Accounting Aspects of Costs of Nonqualified Compensation Plans,
1972-1 N.Y.U. 30rH INST. ON FED. TAX. 443; Jones, Comparative Analysis of Qualified and
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plan was not qualified because "at all relevant times, at least one
partner . . .actually received a distribution of firm profits which
exceeded 10 percent of total firm profits"" and thus the plan cov-
ered owner-employees within the meaning of section 401(c)(3),
which provides:
For purposes of this section-
(3) Owner-employee-The term "owner-employee"
means an employee who-
(B) in the case of a partnership is a partner who
owns more than 10 percent of either the capital interest
or the profits interest in such partnership.
To the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the Sec-
retary or his delegate, such term also means an individual
who has been an owner-employee within the meaning of the
preceding sentence. 2
The partnership argued that the mere receipt of more than ten
percent of the partnership's profits is not ownership. Ownership, it
said, is determined by the partnership agreement, which bases a
partner's share of profits on this productivity. 3 Since no partner had
an absolute advance contractual right to receive more than a ten
percent profits interest, no partner owned more than a ten percent
interest in the partnership. The sole owner-employee example in the
section 401 regulations allows that "an individual who owns only 2
percent of the profits interest but 11 percent of the capital interest
of a partnership is an owner-employee."' 4
The partnership also asserted that a distribution based on pro-
ductivity is not capital in nature, but an interest in partnership
profits is a capital asset. 5 Because the distribution was of ordinary
income and not of a capital asset, it could not be a partnership
interest.
The Tax Court rejected the partnership's definition of "owns":
Deferred Compensation Plans: Non-Equity Type Deferred Compensation Arrangements
(Qualified Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans and Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation
Plans and Contracts), 1974-1 N.Y.U. 32D INST. ON FED. TAx. 957.
11. 67 T.C. at 415. The Service conceded that no partner owned more than 10% of the
capital interest in the partnership.
12. I.R.C. § 401(c)(3).
13. 67 T.C. at 415. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-10(d) (1963): "A partner's interest in the profits
and the capital of the partnership shall be determined by the partnership agreement."
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-10(d) (1963).
15. 67 T.C. at 418-19; see I.R.C. § 741.
19781
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[W]e do not agree . . . that this word contemplates necessarily
"a contractual agreement, fixing, in advance the percentages of the
partnership profits to be awarded each partner.". . .Its meaning
in a statute is affected by the context and the legislative purpose
of the provision in which it is used."
The Tax Court found that under the partnership agreement, each
partner had a contractual right to receive his distributive share as
calculated under the fixed, agreed-to formula.1" It held further that
any partner could transfer or bequeath "his contractual rights in
partnership profits, whatever the amount thereof might be. That
constitutes ownership of an interest in those profits . "'I The
Tax Court rejected the partnership's capital asset assertion."
Although the Service has not promulgated regulations defining
who "has been an owner-employee" as mandated by section
401(c)(3), the Tax Court stated that the language "indicates a con-
gressional intent that the partner's ownership rights be measured at
the end of the business year. '20 Consequently, since a partner had
received more than ten percent of the profits of the partnership
pursuant to a contractual formula, that partner was an "owner-
employee" within the meaning of section 401(c)(3), and the plan did
not qualify under section 401(a).
The dissent stressed that the section 401 regulations defining
owner-employee "do not set forth any test as to when an individual
has been an owner-employee nor do the regulations explain what is
meant by 'owning' an interest in the capital or profits."'" The dis-
sent pointed out that the section 401 regulations based ownership
in terms of the partnership agreement, but "[tihe majority looks
outside the partnership agreement to see what . ..partners have
received .... "122 The dissent also identified the uncertain nature
of partners' shares under the partnership agreement and criticized
16. 67 T.C. at 419 (citation omitted).
17. Id. at 420.
18. Id.
19. Id. The court stated:
Where the consideration received by the taxpayer for the sale of a partnership
interest was a "present substitute for what would have been ordinary earned income
in the hands of the assigning taxpayer, if the assignment or transfer had not been
made," the courts have treated the sale as an assignment of future income. United
States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287, 291 [13 AFTR 2d 311] (5th Cir. 1963); Roth v.
Commissioner, 321 F.2d 607, 610-611 [12 AFTR 2d 53921 (9th Cir. 1963), affg. 38
T.C. 171 (1962); Frank A. Logan, 51 T.C. 482, 485-486 (1968).
Id. at 419.
20. Id. at 420.
21. Id. at 422 (emphasis in original).
22. Id.
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the majority for equating "1 year's 'distributive share' with 'profits
interests.' 23 Finally, the dissent underscored the impracticality of
the majority's ownership test vis-a-vis its stated purpose to elimi-
nate abuses:
[Ilf the owner-employee cannot be identified until the end of the
year when the accounting is completed and such owner-employee
may or may not be an owner-employee in the subsequent taxable
year, how can it be determined who is going to commit the abusive
acts that the definition of owner-employee was designed to
correct?
2
That Congress anticipated that profit sharing plans covering
owner-employees would "present greater opportunities for abuse"
was recognized by the Tax Court in Hill.25 But the court linked this
intent directly to the language of section 401(c)(3), which
permissively invites the Service to define "who has been an owner-
employee."2 The Tax Court overlooked language, expressed within
the same subdivision of the Senate Report it cited, referring only to
"a partner who does not own more than a 10-percent interest in the
business (and thus. is not an owner-employee) . . . ."2 Likewise,
neither the House nor the Conference Report discusses this lan-
guage. This suggests that Congress delegated to the Service the
discretion to define who has owned more than ten percent of either
the capital or the profits interest in a partnership. The Service has
refrained from exercising this discretion.
The profits interest concept is critical in the disallowance of
"special allocations." A partnership may allocate items of income,
gain, loss, deduction, or credit; but if the allocation does not have
"substantial economic effect," then "the partners' distributive
shares of that item shall be determined in accordance with the ratio
in which the partners divide the general profits or losses of the
partnership . "...1,28 For example, if in real estate partnership AB
23. Id. at 424. The dissent stated:
[The agreement] prevents any partner from owning a fixed percentage of the net
profits of the partnership for any given year because each partner's share of the
profits necessarily rests upon three variables; i.e., the new clients brought to the
firm by such partner, the total income earned by the partnership and the expenses
paid by the partnership for the year involved.
Id. at 423-24 (emphasis in original).
24. Id. at 426.
25. 67 T.C. at 417, quoting H.R. REP. No. 378, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), 1962-3 C.B.
261, 262; S. REP. No. 992, supra note 8, at 1962-3 C.B. 305.
26. I.R.C. § 401(c)(3).
27. S. REP. No. 992, supra note 8.
28. I.R.C. §§ 702 and 704(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964).
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all depreciation deductions are allocated to partner A, but the part-
ners have made equal contributions to and have otherwise equal
interests in the partnership, under section 704 the depreciation de-
ductions will be reallocated in accordance with the partners' general
sharing ratio, or fifty percent to A and fifty percent to B. 25 Another
important circumstance involves section 708: a partnership is con-
sidered as terminated if "within a 12-month period there is a sale
or exchange of 50 percent or more of the total interest in partnership
capital and profits."0 As recently as 1976, Congress considered de-
fining partners' partnership interests, but has not done so.3'
While the structure of a law firm such as the Hill partnership
neither permits nor encourages an allocation formula which would
always avoid the Tax Court's definition of "owns," similar partner-
ships may yet be able to avoid the definition. The section 401 regu-
lations state that a "guaranteed payment (as described in section
707(c)) is not considered a distributive share of partnership income"
for the purpose of determining whether a partner is an owner-
employee.32 Guaranteed payments under section 707(c) are pay-
ments made "without regard to the income of the partnership" to a
partner not acting in a capacity as a partner. Because guaranteed
payments are treated as ordinary income and as if made to an
employee, it is appropriate that they are not considered as a part-
ner's profits interest. Under the section 721 regulations the receipt
of a partnership interest "for services rendered to the partnership
. . . is a guaranteed payment for services under section 707(c)
. ... ', Partners in Hill received their profits interest in return for
services; thus, under the section 721 regulations the receipt was a
guaranteed payment. As such, under the section 401 regulations it
was not a partnership interest for the purpose of section
29. See Stanley C. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-1069
(9th Cir. 1973); Weidner, Partnership Allocations and Tax Reform, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1,
15-23 (1977).
30. I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B).
31. The House suggested the following permanent allocation method in proposing the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520:
A partnership will ordinarily be considered to have a "permanent method" of
allocating taxable income or loss if (1) it has consistently applied such method over
a number of years, and (2) it meets both the business purpose and significant tax
avoidance tests provided under the amended section 704(b).
H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 125, 127 (1975). See Weidner, supra note 29, at
57-58 n.211.
The Senate dropped this proposal in scrapping the House test of special allocations. Id. at
55-63.
32. Treas. Reg. § 401-10(d) (1963).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(2)(i) (1960).
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401(c) (3) (B).11
Valuation may provide yet another way to avoid the Tax Court's
definition of owner-employee. In Vestal v. United States,35 the tax-
payer received an interest in partnership capital in return for serv-
ices. Vestal failed to pay income tax upon receiving the interest.
After the statute of limitations had run, the partnership sold its
assets at a substantial gain and Vestal sought to treat the amount
he realized as capital gain.3" He argued successfully before the dis-
trict court that his basis in the partnership interest was the amount
he should have included in his income when the interest was trans-
ferred, and that subsequent appreciation was properly recognized as
capital gain.37 But on appeal the Service prevailed. The Eighth
Circuit determined that although the interest Vestal received had
value, its receipt was not necessarily a taxable event:
When dealing with a situation such as the present where taxpayer
holds an executory contingent contract payable in the future, the
tax laws should not be construed . . . to permit him to establish a
basis for those same contract rights in the absence of a showing
that there was an actual trading or marketing of those rights. 38
What, then, is the value of a Hill-type executory contingent
contract-profits sharing interest which includes a partner's right to
receive twenty percent (less proportional overhead) of the fees from
clients he recruits? The Tax Court in Hill held that "[t]his policy
allowing a partner to share in all fees paid by a client he has ob-
tained gives him a continuing right from year to year to a portion
of the firm's profits. '3 But a more credible answer to the value
question was suggested by the Board of Tax Appeals in Humphrey
Barton.40 Barton attempted to avoid taxation on money distributed
to him by his partnership. He alleged that the distribution repre-
sented a nontaxable return of his capital contribution to the part-
34. In Hill, the calculation of a partner's profits interest would be based solely on the final
one-third of profits allocated according to the ratio of the 19 partners' capital accounts. The
interest amounts to approximately a one-nineteenth share per partner, well below the 10%
limitation.
35. 498 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1974).
36. Id. at 488.
37. The district court opinion is unofficially reported at 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9260 (W.D.
Ark. 1973).
38. 498 F.2d at 493-94. See United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), rev'g
213 F. Supp. 457 (W.D. La. 1963) (a profits interest in a partnership does not exist until the
interest becomes possessory).
39. 67 T.C. at 418.
40. 13 B.T.A. 1184 (1928).
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nership-"25 law cases in which he had been retained. . .. ,,4, The
Board disagreed:
Even if there is any legal basis sufficient to support the claim of
[BartonI the value of the law cases was contingent and highly
speculative and can not be regarded as a capital contribution to
the partnership in any amount which the evidence enables us to
determine."
If, as in Barton, the right to represent clients in present litigation is
valueless, the mere right to receive a percentage of a client's fees, if
any, must also be presumed to be valueless.
The Hill decision holds other ramifications. Fresh doubt is in-
jected into the snare of partnership taxation referred to as the "flip-
flop" problem. This problem stems from Treasury Regulation §
1.752-1(e), which provides that a partner shares in a partnership's
nonrecourse liabilities in the same proportion as the partner shares
in partnership profits. Under sections 752(a) and 722, the partner's
basis is increased by this amount. Therefore, if a partner's interest
in partnership profits is reduced and the partnership has non-
recourse liabilities, then the partner realizes income in an amount
equal to the proportional reduction of his share of nonrecourse lia-
bilities.43 Under Hill, a partner is considered as owning an interest
in partnership profits in the amount to which he becomes entitled.
That interest will fluctuate, perhaps dramatically, depending upon
a partner's performance for a given year. A partner might be work-
ing on a contingency fee basis, and one year win a stunning personal
injury award. The partner would receive a large share of partnership
profits, increasing his profits interest and his proportional share in
non-recourse liabilities. Assume that the following year is average
for the partner, and no large awards are won. His share of partner-
ship profits is proportionally smaller, reducing his profits interest
and proportional share of nonrecourse liabilities. The partner faces
the adverse tax consequences of a constructive distribution. Also,
the same problem faced the partner's colleagues in the preceding
year when the partner won the award, increased his profits interest,
and proportionally reduced his colleagues' shares of nonrecourse
liabilities."
41. Id. at 1185.
42. Id. at 1187.
43. See Rev. Rul. 74-40, 1974-1 C.B. 159.
44. See 1 A. WiLius, PARTNESHI TAXATION 255-59, 487-88 (1976); Lee, Constructive Cash
Distributions, 22d WM. & MARY TAX CONF. 129 (1977); Parker & Lee, Constructive Cash
Distributions in a Partnership, 41 J. TAX. 88 (1974).
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Additionally, the Tax Court's definition of ownership may com-
plicate the application of section 83, relating to property transferred
in connection with the performance of services. Under section 83, if
a person receives property which is nontransferable or subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture, that property is not included in the
recipient's income until the transfer becomes complete, unless
within thirty days the recipient elects to realize the receipt.,'
"Substantial risk of forfeiture" under section 83 means that a
"person's rights to full enjoyment of [the restricted] property are
conditioned upon the future performance of substantial services by
any individual."4 The proposed regulations under section 83 pro-
vide that until the transfer of restricted property becomes complete,
the transferor shall be regarded as the owner of such property, and
any income from such property received .. .by the employee or
independent contractor constitutes additional compensation and
shall be included in the gross income of such employee or indepen-
dent contractor for the taxable year in which such income is re-
ceived . . .
Under the Hill definition of "owns," the application of section 83
to partnerships would be narrowed.48 A partner receiving a Hill-type
partnership interest, although conditioned upon the performance of
substantial services, would be treated as owning the partnership
interest. The partner would recognize any distributive share of part-
nership losses and would determine the character of any distributive
share of partnership income as if it had been received directly rather
than through an entity. The partner would realize loss on the forfei-
ture of the partnership interest and, upon selling the interest, treat
its appreciation as capital gain.4"
But circumventing section 83 is not without a drawback. Under
section 83, a service partner ° receiving a restricted partnership in-
terest, for example, would not share in the tax losses and deductions
venerated by high-bracket investors. As transferors, the investors
would be treated as owning the interest until the transfer became
45. See I.R.C. § 83(b).
46. I.R.C. § 83(c)(1). "Whether such services are substantial depends upon the particular
facts and circumstances." Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (1971).
47. Prop. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)'(1971).
48. For a discussion of the applicability of I.R.C. § 83 to partnerships, see Cowan, Receipt
of a Partnership Interest for Services, 1974-2 N.Y.U. 32D INST. ON FED. TAx. 1501, 1527.
49. I.R.C. §§ 702, 731, 741.
50. A service partner receives a partnership interest in exchange for a promise of personal
services.
1978]
196 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:187
complete. But following the Hill definition of "owns," the
transferee-service partner would share in the tax sheltering items,
defeating "a mechanism that would pass all tax losses from service
partners to high-bracket investor-partners."51
Finally, ordinary income may be transformed into capital gain
under the Hill definition of ownership, rekindling the controversy
surrounding the now renowned case of Diamond v. Commissioner.5"
Diamond received an interest in partnership profits solely in ex-
change for securing financial backing for a partnership's purchase
of real estate. Diamond's partner agreed to pay all costs exceeding
the amount of financing, but, until reimbursed for the costs, Dia-
mond's partner was entitled to receive all partnership profits. Losses
and postreimbursement profits were allocated sixty percent to Dia-
mond and forty percent to his partner. Shortly after receiving his
interest, Diamond sold it and sought to treat the amount realized
as capital gain.53 The Service successfully reclassified Diamond's
gain as ordinary income.54
Section 721 provides that a partner does not recognize gain or loss
upon contributing property to a partnership in exchange for an in-
terest in the partnership. The Diamond dispute centered upon a
parenthetical in the 721 regulations: "To the extent that any of the
partners gives up any part of his right to be repaid his contributions
(as distinguished from a share in partnership profits) in favor of
another partner as compensation for services . . . section 721 does
not apply."55 Diamond asserted that this parenthetical required the
application of section 721 to transfers of an interest in partnership
profits in exchange for services. Thus, under section 721 no gain or
loss is recognized on the transfer. But the Tax Court rejected this
reading of the regulations and required Diamond to recognize as
ordinary income the value of the profits interest transferred. 6 But
the Tax Court also noted that "there may be some kind of equitable
justification for giving the parenthetical clause some kind of affirm-
ative operative scope, as perhaps where there is a readjustment of
partners' shares to reflect services being performed by one of the
partners . ... "I'
51. Weidner, Pratt and Deductions for Payments to Partners, 12 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.
J. 811 (1977).
52. 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
53. Id. at 286-87.
54. Id. at 292.
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960).
56. Sol Diamond, 56 T.C. 530, 545-46 (1971).
57. Id. at 546.
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Under this dictum in Diamond, it follows that if a member of a
Hill-type partnership receives an interest in partnership profits in
exchange for services, no gain or loss will be recognized under sec-
tion 721; and, on the sale of the interest, under section 741, the
partner will receive capital gain treatment.
In summary, the partnership should defeat the Tax Court's defi-
nition of profits interest and owner-employee by employing either
the guaranteed payment or valuation approach. If Hill is affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit, then the taxation of partnerships will be sad-
dled with further uncertainty: the constructive distribution issue is
fueled; the transformation of ordinary income into capital gain
might be achieved under the Diamond dictum; and rules for taxa-
tion of restricted property may be upset. Hill-type profit sharing
plans now face a Service attack carrying adverse tax consequences
for all involved.
DAViD BRIAN MURSTEN
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